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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SURVEY: COMMERCIAL SPEECH
INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Circuit, for the second consecutive survey period,' handed
down an important constitutional law decision regarding commercial speech.
In Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado,2 three issues-commercial speech, the
extent of private rights of access to public records, and attorney advertis-
ing-amassed to create an intriguing but questionable decision. Lanphere &
Urbaniak addressed whether a state legislature could bar access to public
records when those procuring the records were utilizing them solely for eco-
nomic gain. Attorneys Lanphere and Urbaniak contested the statute as an
impermissible restraint on their free speech rights, basing their challenge on
the limited protection afforded commercial speech.
In addressing the issues posed by Lanphere & Urbaniak, this Survey
discusses the evolution of the commercial speech doctrine, including recent
Supreme Court pronouncements on the topic. The Survey also examines the
existence and extent of private rights of access to public records and the hotly
debated decisions regarding the permissibility and propriety of attorney adver-
tising. The Survey criticizes the circuit's decision as inconsistent with recent
Supreme Court decisions and concludes that the Colorado statute is an imper-
missible restraint on free speech.
I. LANPHERE & URBANIAK V. STATE OF COLORADO: COMMERCIAL SPEECH,
PUBLIC RECORDS, AND DIRECT-MAIL SOLICITATION
A. Evolution and Protection of Commercial Speech Under the First
Amendment
In 1942, the U.S. Supreme Court held in a brief three page decision that
the Constitution imposes no restraints on government regulation of "purely
commercial advertising."3 Although this initial foray into the commercial
1. During the 1993 survey period the Tenth Circuit decided Adolph Coors Co. v. Bentsen,
2 F.3d 355 (10th Cir. 1993), affd, 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995). For a discussion of Coors, see J. Bart-
lett Johnson, Constitutional Law Survey, 71 DENy. U. L. REv. 887, 887-93 (1994).
2. 21 F.3d 1508 (1994).
3. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). For an interesting discourse regarding
Valentine and the commercial speech doctrine in general, see Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The
Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REv. 747 (1993). The authors
discuss the pre-Valentine lack of distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech, and
conclude that Valentine explicitly created, without explanation or reliance on prior precedent, the
commercial speech doctrine. Id. at 754-57.
Note that the commercial advertising at issue in Valentine is equivalent to commercial
speech. Although there are many proposed definitions of commercial speech, the Court itself has
traditionally relied on one of two formulations. The first and narrower of the two states that com-
mercial speech is speech that proposes a commercial transaction. Virginia State Board of Pharma-
cy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976). A broader definition,
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speech spectrum was clear and unambiguous, the last fifty-two years of com-
mercial speech jurisprudence have lacked both simplicity and clarity. While
the Court has since concluded that commercial speech deserves some protec-
tion,4 there has been much disagreement over the scope and degree of shelter
such speech should be accorded under the First Amendment.
The definitive break with Valentine's absolutist approach came in 1976,
when the Court expressly abandoned Valentine in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.5 In striking down a
Virginia statute that restricted licensed pharmacists from advertising pre-
scription drug prices, the Court noted that "speech does not lose its First
Amendment protection because money is spent to project it." This protection,
however, is not absolute. False or misleading commercial speech may be regu-
lated," and time, place and manner restrictions imposed
The Court further defined the Virginia Citizens formulation in 1980 when
it handed down the seminal decision in the commercial speech arena: Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.9 The effects of
Central Hudson were two-fold. First, the Court returned to government some
of the regulatory power over commercial speech that presumably was lost after
Virginia Citizens. Second, the Court adopted a four-part test to be applied
when deciding commercial speech issues. Under this analysis, it is first neces-
sary to determine whether the First Amendment protects the speech in ques-
tion." This first prong of the Central Hudson test is met if the expression
found in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980), claims that commercial speech is "expression related solely to the economic interests of
the speaker and its audience." In a recent decision, however, the Court redefined commercial
speech in accordance with Virginia State Board of Pharmacy. This definition focuses on the dis-
tinguishing characteristics of commercial speech, such as whether money is spent to project it,
whether the speech is carried in a publication sold for profit, whether the speech solicits money,
and whether the speech is on a commercial subject. Peter J. Tarsney, Regulation of Environmental
Marketing: Reassessing the Supreme Court's Protection of Commercial Speech, 69 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 533, 551-52 (1994) (citing Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1512
(1993)).
4. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
5. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Rumblings of the Court's changing stance on the issue, however,
could be heard three years earlier in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). In
Lehman, the majority concluded that a municipality's refusal to allow political advertising on city-
owned rapid transit vehicles did not constitute a violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 304. The
majority based its conclusion on a finding that legitimate state interests were at stake. Id. at 303-
05. The dissenters (Lehman was a 5-4 decision) argued, however, that the city was banning mes-
sage content, since only political advertising was restricted. Id. at 310.
6. Virginia Citizens, 425 U.S. at 761. Rather, the Court stated that restriction of entire cate-
gories of speech solely on the basis of inclusion in that category is forbidden. Id.
7. Id. at 771-72 ("The First Amendment... does not prohibit the State from insuring that
the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely.").
. . 8. Id: at 771. These restrictions must "serve a significant governmental interest [and]...
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information." Id. In short, com-
mercial speech is entitled to protection only from "unwarranted governmental regulation." Id. at
761-62.
9. -447 U.S. 557 (1980).
10. Id. at 564-66. Virginia Citizens implied that commercial speech could only be restricted
if the speech .sought to be regulated is false or misleading. Central Hudson, however, permits
states to regulate even truthful advertising. In order to do so, the state carries the burden of dem-
onstrating that its regulation will further a substantial state interest. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at
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concerns lawful activity and is not misleading." Next, the deciding court
must determine whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. 2 If
these initial tests are met, 3 the court must then decide, third, whether the
"regulation directly advances" the asserted governmental interest and, fourth,
whether it "is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.' ' 4
The Court has attempted, with mixed results, to recharacterize the final
two prongs of the analysis. Under Central Hudson, the third prong inquiry is
satisfied if the governmental body demonstrates that the restriction directly
furthers the asserted state interest." Hence, a regulation that "provides only
ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose" does not directly
advance the asserted interest and will not be upheld under the original frame-
work. 6 However, in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co., the
Court held that the legislature's "reasonable" belief that the restrictions ad-
vanced the asserted state interest satisfied the third prong. 7
This decidedly deferential and "reasonableness" approach continued as the
predominant interpretation of Central Hudson's third prong until 1993, when
the Supreme Court decided Edenfield v. Fane.5 There, the Court struck down
a Florida law prohibiting certified public accountants from engaging in direct,
personal solicitation of clients.' 9 In doing so, the Court emphasized that under
Central Hudson's third prong "a governmental body seeking to sustain a re-
striction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are




13. A court will only proceed to the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson analysis
if the speech survives scrutiny under these initial inquiries. Id.
14. Id. Central Hudson describes the final two prongs of the analysis as criteria for deter-
mining whether the state interest asserted in prong two is substantial and if the regulatory tech-
nique adopted is proportionate to that interest. Id. at 564.
15. Id. ("[T]he Court has declined to uphold regulations that only indirectly advance the state
interest involved."). Under prong three, the court will "focus on the relationship between the
State's interests and the advertising ban." Id. at 569.
16. Id.
17. 478 U.S. 328, 341-42 (1986). The Posadas reasonableness test thus appears to favor less
scrutiny of governmental action and further judicial deference to government regulation. In fact,
many commentators interpret Posadas as representing little more than rational basis review. See,
e.g., Albert P. Mauro, Jr., Commercial Speech After Posadas and Fox: A Rational Basis Wolf in
Intermediate Sheep's Clothing, 66 TuL. L. REv. 1931 (1992). However, the Court itself has never
formally adopted such a standard. Note also that Posadas characterizes steps three and four in the
Central Hudson analysis as "involv[ing] a consideration of the 'fit' between the legislature's ends
and the means chosen to accomplish those ends." Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341.
Many commentators have suggested that the deferential approach adopted in Posadas is
applicable only when a "vice" activity is being regulated. See, e.g., Tarsney, supra note 3, at 546-
47. Commonly regulated vice activities include gambling, alcoholic beverages, tobacco and prosti-
tution. Id. at 547. In a recent decision, however, the Supreme Court refused to consider whether
vice activities were subject to a lower level of scrutiny. United States v. Edge Broadcasting, 113
S. Ct. 2696, 2703 (1993).
18. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
19. Id. at 1796.
20. Id. at 1800. The two asserted state interests in Edenfield were protection of consumers
from fraud (as well as protection of privacy) and furtherance of the accountant's independence, a
necessary component of the attestation function. id. at 1799. While the Court found these interests
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This expansion demonstrates a significant departure from the "reasonableness"
approach adopted in Posadas, and may indicate a return to the initial Central
Hudson framework.2 As it stands, however, Central Hudson's third prong
remains in flux, awaiting further clarification by the Court.
Central Hudson's fourth prong has also been the subject of much debate.
Whereas the framework as set forth in Central Hudson, if read literally, im-
poses a least-restrictive-means test,22 courts have not read the Central Hudson
language to create such a requirement. The Supreme Court adopted this devia-
tion in 1989 when it decided Board of Trustees v. Fox,23 which served as the
determinative break with the least-restrictive-means interpretation. Fox merely
requires the means to be "narrowly-tailored to achieve the desired objec-
tive." 4 Under this requirement, the legislature's regulatory technique must
merely be reasonable. 25 In contrast, a least-restrictive-means test would re-
quire the government to demonstrate that no other regulatory technique could
further its asserted interest to the same degree. Hence, Fox's narrowly tailored,
or "reasonable fit," requirement undoubtedly gives governmental
decisionmakers greater deference to determine which regulatory method best
suits the asserted interest.26
In 1993, the Court confirmed its adherence to the narrowly tailored stan-
dard with its decisions in United States v. Edge Broadcasting27 and City of
substantial, it concluded that the regulatory technique adopted by the Florida Board of Ac-
countancy did not advance "these interests in a direct and material way." Id. at 1798.
21. In addition to recharacterizing the third prong yet again, the Court in Edenfield alleviated
any notions that the Central Hudson framework represents rational basis review. It thus stated that
the Court will only examine those interests put forward by the state; under Central Hudson, the
Court will not speculate as to other possible state interests, as would be allowed under rational
basis review. Id. at 1798. Moreover, the Court will scrutinize the asserted state interest to ensure it
is the actual interest "served by the restriction." Id. at 1798-99 (citing Mississippi Univ. for Wom-
en v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982)). The Court also placed some emphasis on the Board's
failure to demonstrate, through studies or other "anecdotal evidence," that the restrictions ad-
vanced the asserted state interests. Id. at 1800. Hence, a "reasonable belief," such as that in
Posadas, on the part of the legislature may now be insufficient to satisfy step three of the analy-
sis.
22. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 ("[I]f the governmental interest could be served as
well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot sur-
vive.").
23. 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) ("[Wle now .. conclude that the reason of the matter re-
quires something short of a least-restrictive-means standard.").
24. Id. While the Court alleged that its decisions could not be reconciled with a least-restric-
tive-means standard, id. at 479, the cases are clearly to the contrary. For example, in Central
Hudson the Court not only stated a least-restrictive-means test, but also applied one. See Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569-71. The Court even went so far as to suggest alternative, but less restric-
tive, means that the Commission could have employed. Id. The Court continued its application of
the least-restrictive-means standard in Posadas, where it stated that "the restrictions on commercial
speech [were] no more extensive than necessary to serve the government's interest." Posadas, 478
U.S. at 343. In furtherance of this point, the Court noted that the Puerto Rico Superior Court had
narrowed the statute considerably to ensure compliance with this requirement. Id. Thus, as the
dissent in Fox points out, the majority reaches its holding "only by recasting a good bit of con-
trary language in our past cases." Fox, 492 U.S. at 486 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
25. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (citing In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)). Hence, after Fox
"a regulation ... can ... be more extensive than is necessary to serve the government's interest
as long as it is not unreasonably so." City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505,
1519 (1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
26. See Fox, 492 U.S. at 480-81.
27. 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2705 (1993) ("We made clear in [Fox] that our commercial speech
[Vol. 72:3
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network." In doing so, however, the Court in Dis-
covery Network maintained that the standard was greater than rational basis re-
view.29 As such, courts will not require the regulation to be the least severe
method available, but will examine whether there are "numerous and obvious
less-burdensome alternatives."3 The existence or nonexistence of such alter-
natives serves as a factor in determining whether the fit is reasonable."
In Edge Broadcasting, the Court further held that challenges to a statute
as applied to the plaintiff, in an individual capacity, should be resolved under
Central Hudson's fourth prong.32 Previously, and in the court of appeal's de-
cision in Edge Broadcasting, challenges of this nature were based on the third
prong of the analysis.33 As a result, only when a statute's general application
is contested will the more stringent third step be the focal point of the analy-
sis.34 Note that at least one commentator has concluded, however, that special
circumstances may limit Edge Broadcasting to its facts.35 Even so, the
Court's intention, as demonstrated in Fox, Edge Broadcasting, and Discovery
Network, to discard the least-restrictive-means standard in favor of the narrow-
ly tailored approach cannot be questioned.
B. Regulation of Direct-Mail Solicitation by Attorneys
Armed with new-found commercial speech protection courtesy of Virginia
Citizens, in 1977, two Arizona lawyers placed an ad in a local newspaper
publicizing their fees for various routine legal services. This advertisement
contradicted every bar regulation in the country, as well as two hundred years
of traditional attorney restraint. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held in Bates
cases require a fit between the restriction and the government interest that is not necessarily per-
fect, but reasonable."). The Court in Edge Broadcasting characterized the fourth-prong inquiry as
a determination of "whether the regulation is more extensive than is necessary to serve the gov-
ernment[al] interest." Id. at 2704-05. Noticeably absent is the familiar "no" that traditionally pre-
ceded "more extensive." See, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; Posadas, 478 U.S. at 343.
Thus, Edge Broadcasting represents the Court's final recharacterization of Central Hudson's
fourth prong.
28. 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1510 n.13 (1993).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. The Court in Discovery Network also noted that the governmental body must assert
an interest that seeks to protect a commercial harm. Id. at 1515. Moreover, unless there exists
some demonstrable difference between the prohibited commercial speech and noncommercial
speech, courts will refuse to accept the. "low value" of commercial speech as a justification for a
categorical ban. Id. at 1516. The Court also warned against "plac[ing] too much importance on the
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech." Id. at 1514. Rather, the distinction
must bear some relationship to the interests asserted. Id.
32. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2703-05.
33. See, e.g., id. at 2704.
34. Id. The statute must still directly advance the state interest as required by prong three of
the analysis. Also, all four prongs of the Central Hudson framework still must be satisfied.
35. Tarsney, supra note 3, at 561. Tarsney states two facts that may limit Edge
Broadcasting's precedential value. First, a vice activity was being regulated. id. Hence, the Court
may have afforded the statute greater deference, as vice activities are afforded special treatment.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Second, the Court may have been more willing to
manipulate the Central Hudson framework because Congress had few or no other methods to reg-
ulate state run lottery systems. Tarsney, supra note 3, at 561-62.
1995]
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v. State Bar of Arizona36 that states could not impose blanket bans on attor-
ney advertising. Nearly twenty years after this historic decision; however, the
propriety of attorney advertising continues to be intensely debated. Although
Bates purported to bestow upon attorneys the right to engage in so-called
"traditional" advertising in newspapers, periodicals and the like, the opinion
expressed specific reservations about the permissibility of in-person solicita-
tion.37
Just one year later, these reservations were addressed in Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n.3" Citing the overriding state interests in "protecting consum-
ers, regulating commercial transactions, and maintaining standards among
members of the licensed professions," the Court upheld a regulation restricting
in-person solicitation." In contrast to public advertising, in-person solicitation
exerts pressure upon and demands an immediate response from a specific
individual.' Hence, bar association restrictions prohibiting such action serve
the "legitimate and important state interest" of protecting the public from the
unwanted effects of solicitation.4
In 1985, the Court in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel2 again
expanded the sphere of protection accorded attorney advertising. The Court
held that a state may not impose a blanket ban on written, public advertise-
ments directed toward specific potential clients facing particular legal dilem-
mas.43 Zauderer, in conjunction with Bates and Ohralik, thus set the stage for
the debate over direct-mail solicitation, a novel and recent phenomenon having
characteristics of both public and in-person advertising."
36. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Bates held that states could not place blanket bans on reasonable
legal advertising which was not false or misleading. The Court based its decision on the limited
protection afforded commercial speech in Virginia Citizens. The Arizona State Bar, which im-
posed the ban, contended lawyer advertising either would or potentially could adversely effect
professionals, mislead the public, impede the administration of justice, produce undesirable eco-
nomic effects, and reduce the quality of legal services. Id. at 364, 368-79. The Court, however,
determined that the consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information outweighed all
of the Bar's proffered interests. Id. at 364.
37. Id. at 356.
38. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
39. Id. at 460, 468.
40. Id. at 457. This pressure could result in confronted individuals making hasty and unin-
formed decisions regarding an important and personal matter. Id. Moreover, there is no oppor-
tunity to police the propriety of the communication between the attorney and the potential client.
Id.
41. Id. at 462. These potential effects include "stirring up litigation, assertion of fraudulent
claims, debasing the legal profession, and potential harm to the solicited client in the form of
overreaching, overcharging, underrepresentation, and misrepresentation." Id. at 461. Despite the
Court's conclusion in Ohralik, attorneys occasionally still attempt to solicit clients directly. For an
example, see In re Anis, 599 A.2d 1265 (N.J. 1992).
42. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). The attorney in Zauderer placed a newspaper advertisement seek-
ing potential plaintiffs in suit against Dalkon Shield, the manufacturer of a birth control device
previously proven to be dangerously defective. Id. at 629-31.
43. Id. at 644-47.
44. Like in-person solicitation, direct-mail solicitation is personal (a direct contact addressed
and written to a specific individual), presumably for a specific purpose (representation of the solic-
ited client in a specific legal matter). However, a written contact is less personal and intrusive than
an in-person confrontation, and does not subject the solicited client to the pressures of making an




The Supreme Court ended all speculation regarding the permissibility of
direct-mail solicitation in 1988 when it handed down the still controversial
decision of Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n 5 Relying on the crucial distinc-
tion between in-person and written advertisements, the Court held that states
could not categorically ban attorneys from soliciting clients through the
mail.' The Court noted that written communications may be reflected upon
or even discarded, and involve significantly less privacy invasion than an in-
person confrontation. '7 Moreover, states have several available options in po-
licing such advertising. For example, states could require lawyers to file copies
of the proposed communication with a state agency so as to allow for review
and supervision, and, if appropriate, punishment.' The communication could
bear advertisement identification clauses and provide details of the process by
which concerned recipients could report suspected inaccuracies or abuses.49
Also, state agencies could require the attorney to authenticate the accuracy of
the information prior to mailing."
In short, the Court in Shapero held that the First Amendment prohibits
states from imposing plenary bans on direct-mail solicitation by attorneys."
Although opportunities for attorney abuse may increase without such a ban,
these "isolated abuses or mistakes [do] not justify a total ban" on protected
commercial speech-especially when viewed in light of the many possible re-
strictive arrows states hold in their commercial speech quivers. 2
C. Public Records and Criminal Proceedings
Although the common law historically provided a minimal, if not abso-
lute, right of access to some government records, statutory schemes across the
country have supplanted this common law framework. 3 Moreover, the Su-
preme Court has held that the First Amendment bestows upon the general
45. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
46. Id. at 471, 473-74. In 1985, Shapero contacted the Kentucky Attorneys Advertising
Commission, seeking their approval of a form letter he intended to send to potential clients. Id. at
469. The letter invited and encouraged those persons facing foreclosure on their homes to contact
his office regarding legal representation. Id. Despite the Commission's conclusion that the letter
was not false or misleading, it was denied approval because of a Kentucky Supreme Court rule
prohibiting written advertisements to those facing specific legal problems. Id. The rule permitted
attorneys to mail written solicitations to the general public. Id. at 469-70. The Commission did,
however, express its opinion that the Kentucky rule violated the First Amendment, and suggested
the rules be amended. Id. at 470. Shapero then took his claim to the Kentucky Bar Association's
Ethics Committee, which upheld the rule. Id. The Kentucky Supreme Court struck down the rule
but oddly replaced it with an American Bar Association rule that also prohibited targeted direct-
mail solicitation. Id. at 470-71.
47. Id. at 475-76.
48. Id. at 476.
49. Id. at 477-78.
50. Id. at 477.
51. Id. at 471.
52. Id. at 476.
53. See, e.g., Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1511. The underlying, and most important,
issue for commercial speech purposes, is whether the Constitution can be read to confer such a
right upon the general public. All appearances indicate, as does the current Court, that no such
right exists.
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public no constitutional right of access to government records.54
It may be possible, however, to circumvent this holding when the records
at issue involve criminal proceedings. For example, the Sixth Amendment
right to a fair and public trial may sometimes implicate First Amendment
protection of a right of access. 5 All indications are, however, that this right
only attaches where the public records sought actually relate to and involve an
initiated, ongoing, or completed criminal proceeding.56 Moreover, this right is
triggered only when a tradition of accessibility to the desired records or pro-
ceedings is demonstrated and when public access to the records plays a valu-
able role in "the actual functioning of the process. 5 7 "Experience and logic"
will therefore dictate whether a constitutional right of access attaches.5"
D. Curtailment of Commercial Speech: Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado 9
1. Majority Opinion
The controversy in Lanphere & Urbaniak arose out of a Colorado statute
prohibiting access to public criminal-justice records where the information
contained in the records is to be used to "solicit business for pecuniary
gain. '" The three plaintiffs were Lanphere and Urbaniak, partners in a Colo-
rado Springs law firm, and Frank Mutchler, director of a substance abuse cen-
ter, also located in Colorado Springs.6 Prior to enactment of the challenged
statute, plaintiffs obtained the names and addresses of individuals involved in
alcohol-related traffic incidents.62 Mutchler used the information to solicit
clients for his treatment center, and Lanphere and Urbaniak solicited those
individuals facing prosecution for DUIs and various misdemeanor traffic viola-
tions.63 Both solicitations came in the form of targeted, direct-mail advertise-
ments. 64
Once denied access to the records, plaintiffs sought declaratory and in-
54. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) ("this Court has never intimated a
First Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all sources of information within government
control").
55. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986). Note that even this right,
should it inhere, is not absolute. Id. at 9.
56. See id. at 6-10. For example, the public records sought in Press-Enterprise involved at-
tempts by the media to obtain transcripts of a preliminary hearing in a criminal prosecution. Id. at
4-5.
57. Id. at 8-10, 12.
58. Id. at 9.
59. 21 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1994).
60. Id. at 1510. The Colorado statute in relevant part provides:
Records of official actions and criminal justice records and the names, addresses, tele-
phone numbers, and other information in such records shall not be used by any person
for the purpose of soliciting business for pecuniary gain. The official custodian shall
deny any person access to records of official actions and criminal justice records unless
such person signs a statement which affirms that such records shall not be used for the
direct solicitation of business for pecuniary gain.
CoLO. REv. STAT. § 24-72-305.5 (1994).






junctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of their First and
Fourteenth Amendment free speech rights.' The state of Colorado contended
that the issue was merely one of public records access, not free speech.' Ap-
parently in agreement, the District Court granted summary judgment for Colo-
rado and plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit.67
The Tenth Circuit initially focused on the scope and degree of the tradi-
tional common-law right of access to government records." Although the
common law historically recognized such a right, Colorado statutes effectively
preempted the field and were thus controlling.69 Accordingly, any right of
access to the records not granted by statute required a constitutional source.
The court concluded, based on a strong line of Supreme Court precedent, that
the First Amendment bestowed no such right.7 °
Although Colorado argued that determination of the access question was
dispositive, the court disagreed, noting that the First Amendment was implicat-
ed by the Coiorado legislature's "content-based restriction on protected
speech."'" Because the legislation disfavored commercial speech, the court
applied the four-part test formulated in Central Hudson.72 First, the court
found that the First Amendment protected the speech in question because the
proposed advertising was neither false nor misleading, and the statute denied
all commercial access to the records.73 Second, the court concluded that Col-
orado had a substantial governmental interest in preventing privacy inva-
sions.74 Further, the court held that Colorado's interest in protecting privacy
was directly furthered by denying access to the names and addresses of those
charged with alcohol related traffic violations and preventing solicitors from
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1511.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id; see COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-72-301 to 24-72-308 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
70. Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1512. The plaintiffs, however, argued that a separate
line of cases granted the necessary First Amendment right. Plaintiffs maintained that the Sixth
Amendment right to a fair and public trial implicated a First Amendment right of access to the
records in question. Id. The Court, however, disagreed, stating no tradition for this type of access
existed, and that such access would not positively further any particular process. Id. The dissent
relied heavily upon this reasoning. See infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
71. Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1512-13. The regulation was content based because
the Colorado legislature permitted and denied access to the records based on whether the records
were to be used for commercial purposes, i.e., soliciting pecuniary gain. While the records them-
selves were not "speech," access to the records was determined "based on the speech use" of the
records (if the speech was commercial then access was denied, and vice versa).
72. See supra notes 9-35 and accompanying text.
73. Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1514. The Colorado legislature made no attempt to
deny commercial access only to those solicitations found to be misleading, but rather imposed a
plenary commercial access ban. Id. Nor did Colorado claim that any of the plaintiff's particular
advertisements were misleading. Id.
74. Id. The court noted that discovery of a person's legal affairs constitutes a greater privacy
invasion when the information is used to elicit pecuniary gain than when the same information is
used for a non-economic purpose. Id. Plaintiffs, however, alleged Colorado's stated purpose was
illusory, because the information could be obtained through other sources, including the local
newspapers. Id. The court found, however, that the state had a legitimate, substantial interest in
"not aiding in the dissemination of the information for commercial speech purposes," as well as
reducing the potential for solicitor abuse and "maintaining public confidence in our system of
justice." Id.
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overreaching towards vulnerable solicitation recipients.75
Central Hudson's fourth prong, which requires the regulation to be no
more extensive than necessary to further the siate's interest, caused the most
debate. The court interpreted this prong to require no more than a reasonable
fit between the regulation and the state's asserted interest."6 Both Colorado
and the court's primary task was overcoming and distinguishing Shapero."
The court offered several reasons why Shapero was not controlling. First, the
statute was designed to protect privacy, not to prevent solicitation.78 More-
over, Colorado did not ban direct mail solicitation by attorneys; it merely
established an indirect barrier by not making certain records available for that
purpose.79 Finally, the court considered it relevant that Colorado possessed
the greater power to deny all access to criminal justice records." With the
case distinguished from Shapero, the court held that the Colorado statute con-
stituted a reasonable fit in furtherance of the state's asserted interest, and
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Colorado.
8'
2. Dissent
Judge Aldisert dissented, claiming that the First Amendment right of
access to criminal proceedings rendered the Colorado statute unconstitution-
al. 2 In particular, Judge Aldisert believed that the Press-Enterprise three-part
inquiry controlled and determined the issue. 3 Applying Press-Enterprise,
Judge Aldisert concluded that the Colorado statute denied access to records
that were clearly a part of criminal proceedings.84 Moreover, a historical right
of access to such records existed-a right which added significantly to the
judicial process in question. 5 Accordingly, Judge Aldisert insisted that Colo-
rado have a compelling state interest to justify denial of the records. 6
Judge Aldisert found none of Colorado's asserted interests sufficiently
compelling. 7 These interests included protecting privacy, restricting use of
the records to their intended purpose, and preventing state assistance in un-
75. Id. at 1515.
76. Id. (citing Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476-81 (1989)). In determining
whether such a fit existed, the court balanced the state's interests against the effect of the statute
on commercial speech. Id.
77. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
78. Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1515.
79. Id. Rather, Colorado erected an indirect "barrier to commercial speech." Id.
80. Id. at 1516.
81. Id.
82. Id. (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (Judge Aldisert, a Senior Circuit Judge of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, was sitting by designation).
83. Id; see Press Enterprise v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986).
84. Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1517.
85. Id. at 1517-18. Solicitation adds value to the judicial process by informing individuals of
their legal rights in judicial proceedings. Id. at 1518. Such information is particularly important
where, as here, potential liberty and property interests may be at stake. Id. Finally, allowing sub-
stance abuse centers access to the records for solicitation purposes served the judicial process by





wanted solicitation by those seeking economic gain."8 The state's arguments
furthering these interests overlooked that a right of access to such records has
always played a role in preserving the credibility of the criminal justice sys-
tem. 9 Moreover, Supreme Court precedent establishes that restriction of
speech connected to allegedly offensive conduct is an insufficient basis upon
which to deny access to public records."° In addition, the dissent believed that
the statute was underinclusive, and failed to effectively accomplish its stated
objective of protecting privacy.9 Judge Aldisert concluded by noting that the
activity in question, access to criminal proceeding records, enjoyed constitu-
tional protection without regard to the lawful use of that information.92 As
such, the state lacked the power to deny access to the records based solely on
an intent to utilize them to procure pecuniary gain.93
3. Analysis
The court's opinion in Lanphere & Urbaniak is an unfortunate defeat for
commercial speech protection-a defeat based on an unconvincing attempt to
distinguish precedent, as well as the acceptance of an asserted state interest
that was likely illusory. Moreover, recent Supreme Court decisions should
have altered the court's analysis. As a result, the Tenth Circuit appears to be
retreating from the strong commercial speech protection it provided last year
in Adolph Coors Co. v. Bentsen.94
The Colorado statute at issue fails to satisfy the commercial speech frame-
work as delineated in Central Hudson and its progeny. As the Supreme Court
has made clear, speech that is not false or misleading may be regulated only
when a substantial interest is asserted and directly advanced by the regulatory
technique employed, and when a reasonable fit exists between the asserted
interest and the regulation.95
Colorado enacted the legislation96 in question to inhibit privacy inva-
sions.97 Undoubtedly, protecting privacy constitutes a substantial state inter-
est.9 However, courts should be loathe to accept a governmental body's as-
serted interest without further inquiry. Indeed, the Supreme Court has mandat-
ed that courts not "turn away if it appears that the stated interests are not the
actual interests served by the restriction." Moreover, the Court has, in prac-
tice, examined the circumstances to determine what purpose the challenged
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1519.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1518-19.
92. Id. at 1519.
93. Id. at 1519-20.
94. See supra note 1.
95. See supra notes 9-35 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
97. Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1514. Specifically, the interest was protecting "the
privacy of those charged with misdemeanor traffic offenses and DUI." Id.
98. The Supreme Court has held that protection of potential clients' privacy constitutes a
substantial interest. Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1799.
99. Id. at 1798 (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982)).
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statute actually serves in a given case.' °
Ignoring the Supreme Court's directive, and despite evidence to the con-
trary, the court in Lanphere & Urbaniak accepted Colorado's asserted privacy
interest. Evidence offered by the plaintiffs indicated that the legislation actual-
ly was passed to prevent the information provided in the records to be used
for direct-mail solicitation purposes. While little legislative history is available,
remarks by one state senator denote no indication of privacy concerns.'
Confronted by this reality, the court noted the presence of additional state
interests. These interests were "lessening the danger of solicitor abuse and
maintaining public confidence in our system of justice."'0 2 To support this
assertion, the court cited several solicitation cases, including Shapero.'°3
However, none of the cases cited suggests that a state has the power to prohib-
it direct-mail solicitation when the proposed communication is not false or
misleading and no substantial state interest exists."° Yet Colorado never con-
tended that plaintiffs solicitations were in any manner deceptive or untruthful,
and "merely because targeted, direct-mail solicitation presents lawyers with
opportunities for isolated abuses or mistakes does not justify a total ban on
that mode of protected commercial speech."'05 In light of this pronounce-
ment, "lessening the danger for solicitor abuse" should not constitute a sub-
stantial state interest unless the state can bring forward empirical evidence
establishing that such abuses exist. Similarly, the court never explained how
denying access to these records to persons seeking to utilize them for pecuni-
ary gain maintains public confidence in the justice system.
The Colorado statute also fails to survive a proper application of step
three of the analysis. Even assuming arguendo, that Colorado's legitimate state
interest was protecting privacy, permitting and denying access to the records
based on further use for commercial purposes does not materially alleviate any
purported harm as required by Edenfield. In Lanphere & Urbaniak, the court
interpreted step three as merely requiring the statute to "advance the State's
interests in a reasonably direct way."'" As stated above, however, Edenfield
altered this prong of the Central Hudson framework by requiring the state to
demonstrate that "the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in
100. See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1510 (1993).
101. When introducing the amendment, Senator Wells made these remarks: "We were not
[providing access to records] to ... provide a client base ... for people to go out and solicit new
business and... so what this does is it... says that those records are still open but are not to be
used in direct solicitation for pecuniary gain .... Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1514. The
court concluded that this statement merely summarized what the amendment does, but that it was
"not a definitive statement on the state's interest ... and is not inconsistent with the state's assert-
ed interest in protecting privacy." Id. However, the statement itself is conclusive-the state acted
to prevent those in similar positions as plaintiffs from obtaining and using the information to
engage in direct-mail solicitation. While the remarks may not be inconsistent with the state's as-
serted privacy interest, no mention is even made of such an interest, as would be expected if, as
Colorado claimed at trial, privacy was the overriding interest involved.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1799.
105. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476.
106. Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1515.
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fact alleviate them to a material degree."'0 7 The statute, however, fails miser-
ably to accomplish its stated objective. Nowhere in the court's opinion does it
justify its conclusion that privacy invasions are greater and more offensive
when the obtained information is gathered for an economic purpose.' Cer-
tainly, line-drawing based on the intended use of the information in no way
alleviates the fact that such invasions will continue to occur. The only distinc-
tion is that those responsible for the privacy invasion will not be utilizing the
information for pecuniary gain. The statute is thus far too underinclusive to
accomplish effectively its stated purpose."° As such, privacy invasions are
not a significant concern. " 0 Considering the distinct possibility that there are
no real harms in Lanphere & Urbaniak, and the Colorado statute's inability to
alleviate to a material degree the occurrence of privacy invasions, the third
step in the Central Hudson analysis, as delineated under Edenfield, is not
satisfied.
The reasonable fit, or narrowly tailored, requirement of step four also
presents difficulties. In determining whether such a fit existed, the court in
Lanphere & Urbaniak turned to Shapero, and made what it deemed three
important distinctions."' The first of these distinctions was "the added inter-
est in protecting privacy."" 2 While there was no assertion of a privacy inva-
sion in Shapero, the court in Lanphere & Urbaniak never explained the signif-
icance of this distinction. In failing to do so it overlooked that the invasions
are identical, regardless of the source from which the information is derived.
The second and third putative distinctions, respectively, were Colorado's refus-
al to grant access to all groups seeking to utilize the records for pecuniary
gain, and Colorado's ability to ban all access to the records, regardless of
107. Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1800. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
108. Rather, the court allows Colorado to engage in "mere speculation or conjecture" as to the
effect of the statute on privacy invasions, a practice specifically forbidden by the Supreme Court.
Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1800.
109. If privacy interests truly constituted a substantial state interest, Colorado would have
banned all access to the records. Under the current statute, however, a pro-bono attorney or non-
profit substance abuse center legitimately could obtain the information and solicit in precisely the
same manner as plaintiffs. Hence, the absence or presence of a pecuniary objective in no way
effects any privacy invasion.
Also, while the Court in Posadas suggested underinclusiveness was no bar to satisfying the
third prong, Posadas, 478 U.S. at 342-43, two distinctions separate Lanphere & Urbaniak. First,
Posadas was a vice case, and hence arguably receives special treatment by the Court. Second, as
support for its conclusion that "[aippellant's [underinclusivel argument is misplaced," the Court in
Posadas noted that the history of legalized gambling in Puerto Rico supported its conclusion. Id.
at 342-43. Here, however, Colorado historically had provided access to the records. Lanphere &
Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1517 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
110. The present situation is analogous to that in Edenfield. There the Court noted that if the
solicited individual was "unreceptive to his initial telephone solicitation, they need only terminate
the call. Invasion of privacy is not a significant concern." Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1803. Here,
unresponsive individuals need only dispose of or ignore the solicitation.
111. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text. Note also that an argument can be made
that the entire line of cases regarding attorney solicitation should be ignored. In each case in-
volving attorney solicitation, a regulatory board or legislature had enacted an ordinance or law
specifically addressing solicitation only. Here, however, the Colorado statute restricts all commer-
cial speech, without regard to whether the soliciting individual is an attorney, by denying access to
the records.
112. Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1515.
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use." 3 Again, however, the court bases its conclusion on these distinguishing
factors with no meaningful discussion of why these differences render the fit
in Lanphere & Urbaniak reasonable.
In contrast, a strong argument can be made that the fit is unreasonable.
The prohibited privacy invasions, those undertaken with a pecuniary goal, are
no more harmful than the permitted privacy invasions, those undertaken with-
out a pecuniary goal." 4 Hence, the distinction between commercial and non-
commercial speech "bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular inter-
ests" asserted."5 Therefore, Colorado may not restrict access to the records
based on whether the information will serve a commercial purpose, even as-
suming its privacy interest is legitimate." 6
As demonstrated, the Colorado statute fails to withstand scrutiny under the
Central Hudson analysis. Specifically, the state's asserted interest is likely
illusory and, even if legitimate, fails to alleviate privacy invasions to a materi-
al degree. Moreover, Colorado has failed to establish a reasonable fit between
its statute and privacy invasions. Rather than demonstrating genuine concern
for protecting privacy interests, the Colorado legislature appears to be making
normative judgments regarding the relative worth of solicitation as a form of
speech. Such a resolution directly contradicts the "general rule that the speaker
and the audience, not the government, [should] assess the value of the infor-
mation presented."" 7 Properly scrutinized, the statute is an impermissible re-
striction on commercial speech.
113. Id. at 1515-16. Furthermore, the court's assumption that Colorado's ability to prohibit
any access to the records grants it the power to regulate use of the records is suspect. While the
Supreme Court historically has accepted this "greater power includes the lesser power" argument
in the commercial speech context, see, e.g., Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345-346, the Court in Edge
Broadcasting refused to address this assertion. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. CL at 2703 ("The Gov-
ernment argues... that the greater power to prohibit gambling necessarily includes the lesser
power to ban its advertisement .... The Court of Appeals did not address this issue and neither
do we .... ).
114. This situation is analogous to Discovery Network, where the Court stated the city's prop-
osition-that every decrease in commercial newsracks increased safety-was "an insufficient jus-
tification for the discrimination against respondents' use of newsracks that are no more harmful
than the permitted newsracks." Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1511.
115. Id. at 1514.
116. See id. The situation is again analogous to Discovery Network, where the Court stated:
[niot only does Cincinnati's categorical ban... place too much importance on the dis-
tinction between commercial and noncommercial speech, but in this case, the distinction
bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted. It is
therefore an impermissible means of responding to the city's admittedly legitimate inter-
ests."
Id.
Discovery Network also cited another relevant decision, Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455
(1980). Carey struck down a statute concerning picketing because "nothing in the content-based
labor/nonlabor distinction has any bearing whatsoever on privacy." Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct
at 1514 (citing Carey, 447 U.S. at 465). Similarly, nothing in Colorado's pecuniary/nonpecuniary
purpose distinction has any bearing on privacy.
117. Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1798.
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CONCLUSION
Since 1976 and Virginia Citizens, courts have struggled with the proper
scope and degree of First Amendment protection to afford commercial speech.
As a result, the commercial speech doctrine developed into a puzzling array of
contradictory decisions in which deference to legislative judgments was the
only norm. However, in recent years, the Supreme Court has provided much
guidance in the commercial speech arena and generally afforded commercial
speech greater constitutional protection. As such, the Tenth Circuit's decision
in Lanphere & Urbaniak is an unfortunate and poorly justified defeat for
commercial speech.
John E. Joiner

